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SYSERRO

VOLUME ONE, NUMBER FOUR

WHOSE STRIKE WAS THAT ANYWAY?

Contract talks were breaking down between American Telephone and Telegraph and the three major unions of their employees. As a result, workers walked off their jobs at midnight on August 7th. The AT&T strike was on!

We all remember the phone strike of '83. It caused us to hold on directory assistance for several minutes. It gave us many unique error messages. It made it virtually impossible to make any operator-assisted calls from all around the country. For the first time in a long while, the voices at AT&T were not answering the phone.

As we all know, a strike is an organized work stoppage by the employees in order to compel the employer to meet some demand. If the workers go on strike, it stands to reason that the company should suffer. If, for example, the union of Cabbage-Patch® producers was to strike, then none would be made, the factories would quickly be emptied, and consumers would rant and rave. If the local Cabbage-Patch® conglomerate had anticipated a strike, they could step up production, fill several hundred warehouses with millions of the surrogate orphans and, when the strike occurred, they could sell the surplus. The workers would lose their bargaining power in this case, unless the Cabbage-Patch® truckers' union also struck, or perhaps people stopped adopting the cretins, however unlikely that might seem.

This analogy leads us back to last summer when 675,000 telephone employees went on strike. A walk-out of this magnitude should have devastated any company. AT&T, though, is the exception to the rule. What AT&T really depends on are phones, wires, switching systems, computers, electricity, some optical fibers, satellites, microwave towers, and other nifty 21st century things that are all designed to run without the interference of human decision. The people are really just there to remove illegal third party phone calls from your bill, to make sure that your handwritten check matches the computer-read phone bill, or to tell you that the machine you are at cannot return your dime and that you will get a check for 10¢ in the mail. 97% of all calls made today don't use any operator assistance at all. And most of the other 3% could have been dialed without the assistance of a human. More and more "services" of your phone company are becoming *completely* automated. With ESS, customers can dial overseas direct. Android information is popping up left and right. AT&T, a leader in technology, doesn't need their workers all that much.

Glen E. Watts, president of the Communications Workers of America, said, "In 1950, for example, total labor costs amounted to about 45% of the telephone dollar while in 1980 they amounted only to 29%." John Patrick Phillips (author of *Ma Bell's Millions*) says that the company encourages or even "maneuvers" a strike. According to him, Ma Bell reaps huge rewards from a strike. Phillips, a disgruntled ex-employee, who at times compares the phone company to fascism, would have presented AT&T's organized scheme last August like this:

675,000 workers strike for about 3 weeks. 3 weeks out of a year amounts to 5.8% of a worker's salary. Let's say a phone worker made at the time of the strike a modest \$250 per week (operators made \$373, while systems technicians, the best paid workers, made \$535).

At this time AT&T provided substandard service to the people for the same prices. The 3% loss in phone usage due to lack of operators was probably easily made up by people making an extra effort to dial direct and by the fact that some of the calls were being handled by scabbing supervisory level employees. And so, the company nets pure profit: 3 week strike x \$250/week x 675,000 workers = \$506,250,000!

Phillips also notes that because managers and supervisors were doing the dirty work of the phone company, these people could not work on new projects. This means that several hundred million dollars would not be invested in expenditures on new projects because there is no one to do the work. So AT&T would get interest on this money during the strike and even for some time after it was settled until work had resumed. This yields several million more dollars in profit for AT&T.

AT&T probably made out directly with over half a billion dollars from the strike. At the same time companies like New York Telephone sought to delay a \$160 million rate increase so it could ask for another increase to reflect new contracts.

As part of the settlement 21 days later, top craft workers got a 5.5% increase for the first year of their 3 year contract and 1.5% for each of the next two years. They also got a \$31 million training fund (\$46 per employee) to help them deal with new technology and remain employable humans. All of these "gains" are subsidized by the half a billion dollars gaining lots of interest which AT&T did not have to pay to their employees. AT&T at first offered a ridiculous 3.5% increase for the first year and no increase for the next two, but after losing 5.8% of their salary by striking, workers got a 5.5% increase above the cost of living which is probably entirely subsidized by the strike itself and by rate increases.

It's certainly a nifty deal for Ma Bell. Their workers blow off steam and pay for their own raises, and stockholders don't have to worry one bit.

The strike had its effect on the consumer. As we all know, many were dialing, touchtoning®, or redialing their calls almost like usual and others were severely inconvenienced by a few managers and supervisors working as long distance or directory assistance operators often for many hours of overtime. New installations came to a standstill and many were backlogged for several months. Any emergency repairs had to be handled by supervisory personnel. But after all this, the same fat phone bill came to people's homes the next month, without any delay.

In actuality, users cannot complain to or boycott the phone company as they could the Cabbage-Patch® manufacturers, in our earlier scenario. They cannot make AT&T or their local company do anything because each customer is as unimportant as each employee. We, as customers, are all dependent on the phone. We have at least one in each home. We are billed if we use it or not, and are billed more to have it shut off for a month or two. We are all so dependent on the lines that run into our homes and on the one and a half million payphones that absorb our money that the complaints of any one or even thousands of us are quite useless. All of this utility (note the meaning of this word) was until recently controlled almost exclusively by *one* company, so in the name of human spirit, roll on with the divestiture.

THE TROUBLE WITH TELEMAL

GTE is practically inviting intrusions, and odds are they'll get plenty

Last month, two of our reporters took a trip to National Public Radio studios in New York to reveal a very interesting development. It seems that Telemail, the electronic mail service of GTE Telenet was *still* just as easy to access as it was last year, prior to the October raids on computer owners who had allegedly broken into the system.

What had happened was this: a directory containing names of users on the Telemail system was obtained by our reporters—this list can be obtained from virtually any account on the system and, when printed out, is a couple of inches thick. They decided to go through this list and see if there were any accounts that still had the imaginative default password of "A" assigned to them. It had generally been thought, by both the public and press, that this incredibly foolish blunder had been corrected after the raids—in fact, new software was installed which forced a user to change their password from the default when they logged on. All new passwords had to be between 6 and 8 characters in length. But, in a system with many thousands of customers, the reporters reasoned that surely there must be a few who hadn't yet logged on since the policy was implemented.

They decided to start their search with user names that began with "B". They'd enter Telenet through an 800 number, type MAIL, and enter usernames beginning with B that were listed in their directory. For each username, they'd enter "A" as the password, and if it didn't work, they'd go on to the next one.

The first account they tried was named B.ALEXANDER. They entered "A" as the password, and lo and behold, they were in! On the very first attempt! Robert Alexander of BUREC hadn't logged in since last summer. The "invaders" were told by the system to change the password and they complied. Then they decided to have a look around.

While there was no mail to speak of in Mr. Alexander's box, they were able to access bulletin boards that this account was allowed to look at. (Bulletin boards on Telemail are simply long-term storage message bases where messages of general interest to a particular group of people are posted.) All kinds of internal memos from the Department of the Interior were displayed.

In other words, the same old story. Nothing had really changed. Nearly half a year after seizing computers from coast to coast, the Telemail system was just as vulnerable to outsiders as it was before. Were the folks at GTE really interested in securing their system in the first place? Or did they just want to put the fear of the lord into hackers?

At first, when this story was breaking, GTE tried to deny that such a break-in was even possible. It had to be an inside job, they claimed, because nothing is wrong with our system. Then, when it finally started to become clear that this break-in did occur and that it was because of the default passwords once again, GTE took the expected step of blaming the customers. "We're not responsible for maintaining the security of the accounts," they said. "That's up to the subscriber," in this case, the Department of the Interior.

So, our two reporters came up with a plan. What if it hadn't been an outside agency's mailbox, but one belonging to GTE themselves? Who could they blame then?

They went to the letter "D" this time and searched for accounts that were affiliated with GTE. The first one was D.CORCORAN and, once again, they got right in. And Denise Corcoran of GTE had access to literally hundreds and hundreds of bulletin boards with names like PAYROLL, GOV. AFFAIRS, and JAPAN.

On top of all this, it took GTE nearly a week to close

access to these accounts, even after they were exposed on nationwide radio.

What our reporters proved here is that Telemail is either unable or unwilling to protect its customers. Unable? That hardly seems likely. After all, most computer bulletin boards run by high school kids are able to protect their users' accounts from outsiders. Why can't one of the largest and most expensive electronic mail systems do the same? Apparently, what we have here is a company that has grown too big too soon, and is now unable to overcome the inertia that its size has created.

How to Really Have Fun

Once a hacker manages to get into a Telemail account, he's really set. By typing DIR " at command mode, he can get a listing of everyone that the account is allowed to see—their username, full name, company and division, and user number. He can see *any* user if he figures out their full username or user number. Typing DIR USERNAME or DIR USER NUMBER will give all of the above information about that person, if he exists.

From the huge list that DIR " generates (which takes a couple of hours to print at 300 baud), a hacker can scan for passwords that are defaults, first names, last names, usernames, or company names. Some GTE test accounts, for instance, used to have a password of GEENOGTE.




Telemail allows three logon attempts per access. Telenet allows four accesses per call. So each call to Telenet will yield 12 logon attempts to Telemail. Judging from the huge amount of users on the system, finding an easy password doesn't take all that long.

There are all kinds of neat features within Telemail accounts that seem to be exclusively beneficial to hackers. If the account has access to the SET command, the user can tell the system not to print a welcome banner on logon. The information that's printed on the welcome banner tells the user when his last access was. If a hacker arranges for that information not to be printed, the *real* user won't find out that his account was being used at 3 in the morning. And odds are that he won't really notice the absence of the message—if he does, he'll probably blame it on Telemail.

Then there's the UNREAD command. This actually allows a person to read through someone else's undelivered mail, and put it back when they're finished without anyone knowing that it's been read (unless a message was sent with a return receipt, which is rare). Telemail, it seems, practically bends over backwards to accomodate hackers.

What's so great about having a Telemail account? Why should a hacker spend all this time getting one? It's another means of free (or cheap) communications. All one has to do is call Telenet, enter Telemail, and read or send messages that can be *unlimited* in length. He can share one account with someone else (which is the least risky way to work things) or communicate with another usurped account that's allowed to send to and receive from his account. This is naturally a bit more risky since if one account is reclaimed, both may end up being taken down. Transmission of messages on Telemail is instant and there's never a busy signal. More importantly though, Telemail seems to be beckoning the hackers to come back home.

(Shortly after this article was dispatched, we received word that Telemail no longer uses "A" as a default. Whether this is true at all, whether they're now using a default of "B", or whether they're using defaults period, is something that hackers will no doubt find out soon. Drop us a line if you find out anything.)



Bell Credit Card Abuse Soars

2600 News Service

Huge phone bills are being sent to innocent people all over the country. So huge, in fact, that they can't be sent in envelopes—they come in boxes. In the past month and a half, this scene has begun to proliferate.

As predicted on these pages in February, the AT&T death star cards are creating all kinds of problems. All that anyone has to do is glance at one of them to obtain a valid AT&T code. And that's exactly what people are doing. Some of these folks are, in fact, so organized that the codes are used for practically 24 hours a day, with new calls starting as often as 3 times a minute from all different parts of the country. It's rapidly becoming one of the easiest ways to make free phone calls, and best of all, it's through an old friend: Ma Bell!

While AT&T has put itself in a rather vulnerable position, they are not completely without defense. Any time that a credit card call is placed, the number that the call is being placed *from* is recorded and sent to the customer. Most phreaks know enough not to do this kind of thing from their home or local payphone.

Meanwhile, there is a major crackdown underway in Las Vegas concerning unauthorized use of MCI, Sprint, and ITT (AT&T is rumored to also be involved here). It seems that hundreds of people in that gambling town were passing codes around. The FBI claims that the persons involved are *not* phone phreaks, but that phreakers and hackers may have been hired to do the actual code-finding.

Electronics Create Portable Prisons

The New York Times

Cesario Romero, a 23-year-old New Mexico truck driver, recently served a 30 day sentence for disobeying a police officer. He never had to leave his home.

Romero was confined at home by a plastic box the size of a cigarette package that was strapped to his ankle. This device emits radio signals which would have informed the authorities if Romero strayed more than 150 feet from his telephone. The anklet emits a radio signal every 30 to 90 seconds which is picked up by a small receiver connected to the telephone outlet in the wearer's home. The receiver relays the signal to a computer that is monitored by the authorities. The printouts indicate each time the wearer exceeds the 150-foot limit and each time he tries to remove the anklet or unplug the receiver.

District Attorney Steven Schiff of the Second Judicial District said, "For someone like a first-time shoplifter, it could be used as a mild punishment, requiring the person to stay home nights and weekends for a specified time."

The U.S. Justice Department has expressed an interest in this monitoring system.

414's Plead Guilty

The Associated Press

Two young men, both members of the 414 computer enthusiasts group, pleaded guilty to two misdemeanor charges on March 16.

Gerald Wondra of West Allis, WI and Timothy D.

Winslow of Milwaukee, both 21, broke into large computers in the U.S. and Canada last June, simply to prove that they could do it. The two agreed to plead guilty to two counts each of making harassing telephone calls, which is the most they can be charged with, since the government has no law against computer crimes. Each count carries a maximum penalty of six months in jail and a \$500 fine.

The computers involved were located at: Security Pacific National Bank in Los Angeles, Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center in New York, Canada Cement LaFarge Inc. in Vancouver, BC, and Citidel Industries, a New Jersey corporation.

Teller Machine Crime Coming

The Los Angeles Times

The Justice Department says that automated teller machines and other means of electronic financial transactions are "potentially fertile for criminal abuse."

Techniques for robbing the systems already have cropped up and are expected to increase. They range from the dynamiting of an automatic teller device to the withdrawal of funds by a cardholder who then claims no knowledge of the transaction. Because of an absence of sophisticated verification procedures in today's automated teller systems, such as fingerprints or voiceprints, the door is wide open to unscrupulous cardholders committing fraud from their very own accounts. (Some machines, though, take a picture of the person as soon as he takes the cash.)

Even though bank officials may be skeptical of a cardholder's disclaiming any knowledge of a withdrawal that had been made from his or her account, federal law makes it difficult for the officials to reject such a claim. If a bogus loss is reported within two business days, the law makes the cardholder responsible for only the first \$50.

Free Information in Trouble

The Associated Press

According to company spokesman Pic Wagner, AT&T is probably going to propose a 50-cent fee for long distance information calls instead of the 75-cent fee it proposed last fall. Consumers currently don't pay anything for long distance or overseas directory assistance.

A Word on Wiretapping

Long Island Newsday

A recent article by Lenny Siegel, director of the Pacific Studies Center in Mountain View, CA, dealt with the subject of wiretapping.

In this article, Siegel says, "Present law outlaws 'aural' (voice) wiretapping, the monitoring of telephone conversations, without judicial approval, but 'nonaural' surveillance is legal. Law enforcement and intelligence agencies can and do record telephone dialing information—who's calling whom—and digital data transmissions—messages between computers and other electronic devices. In fact, the General Accounting Office, an investigative arm of Congress, warns that existing legislation may permit listening in on the growing percentage of voice transmissions that have been converted to digital pulses within the telephone network."

A TRUE SAGA OF TELECONFERENCING

by Electric Moon

"God, I wish I had a box," David said. "I can see it now. I bump off information in Wisconsin and get an empty WATS line to play with. I keypunch a few multifrequency operator tones, and ta da! It gives me a conference. But I can't do that anyway, since I'm on ESS."

"David," I responded, "I know this sounds stupid, but I don't understand a word of what you just said. Okay, this is what I know from the conference: with a blue box you make tones of certain pitches, so that the phone thinks you're an operator. That way you can make long distance calls for free or start a conference."

"Very good."

"But what's ESS?"

"Anyway," David said, "it's easier and safer to use an extender to call long distance than to box."

"But what's ESS?" I repeated.

"Okay, here we go. The famous Smith briefing for beginning phreaks. Fasten your seatbelts, ladies and gentlemen..."

"I resent being called a beginner," I said.

"In the history of our great phone system, Ma Bell has undergone many changes. In her youth, she was made up of so-called step-by-step systems. These were lovely and easy to circumvent, but noisy and slow. Also, 2600 Hertz disconnects a step system, so you can't box off of one. Most of these were switched by hand by small-town operators. Then someone came up with crossbar switching, and Ma Bell made little clicking noises all day long as she switched almost automatically."

"But, horror of horrors, Ma Bell finally got old. She grew senile and paranoid. In order not to forget things, she wrote them down. Every time a little customer called a number he shouldn't have known, she wrote up a trouble card on him and filed it neatly away. This system was noiseless and easy. Soon Ma came up with better security measures, longer customer records, and tighter filing cabinets. She buried light-fiber cables, and everyone knows you can't splice two light-fiber cables together. She changed her own phone numbers regularly, and computerized everything. Each change came about slowly, but the final product was ESS. So the main phone systems are step, crossbar, and ESS."

"Which one am I on?" I asked.

"I don't know. Some people can tell by listening to the ring or the busy signal, but I can't," he admitted. "If you can get call-waiting, you're on ESS. Call Customer Service and ask."

We talked on conferences almost every night for two weeks. Napoleon Bonaparte set them up, and we talked to the Hacker, Cracker, Tom Keevis, and Max Wilke.

I learned a few things from conferences, and a lot from David. He told me about the Michigan loops. Apparently, if I called a certain number, some stranger would pick up the other end and we could talk. How stupid. Then David explained that the other person was calling a phone number too, and we'd get connected somehow. A loop around here was 424-9900 and 424-9901. If I called one end and someone else called the other, we'd be connected. This was useful if we didn't want to give out our phone numbers. In Detroit, lots of people—not only phreaks—know about loops. If you call up one end of a Detroit loop, someone else is likely to call within five minutes.

"You never know who you'll get," David said. "Hacker and I call and wait, and sometimes homosexuals get on and say, 'Looking for guys?' or girls get on and say, 'Guess what color underwear I have on?' But you also get other people—car salesmen, teenagers, and college students—lots of college students."

He gave me some Michigan loop numbers and I started calling them through extenders. I talked to a lot of weird people and a lot of normal people. I also called some pay phones in Berkeley and Carnegie-Mellon, and talked to whoever answered.

The Phreak was my idol. He was the idol of most of the phreaks I knew. Lots agreed that he was the best phreak and hacker (okay, little did we know then). He was only fourteen years old, and lived in Boston.

One day I called up a Michigan loop and heard a lot of static and clicking. I also heard some people talking—mainly two boys. One of them had an unmistakable Boston accent. It was Steve the Phreak.

"Hey Phreak," I said. "This is Electric Moon!"

"Hi Electric," he said. Then he asked his friend, "Should we keep her?"

"Yeah, what the heck!" said the anonymous phreak. A beep signalled the departure of the Phreak.

"Where'd Steve go?" I asked.

"Off to look for more loops, the idiot," said the boy. "It's too loud in here already."

"What's your name?" I asked.

"I'm Ivanhoe. I'm a Steve too, but you can call me George."

"What?"

"To differentiate between me and Phreak."

"I'll just call you Ivanhoe," I said. "Where're you located?"

"I'm in California. I'm seventeen. And you?"

"I'm in Ohio. I'm sixteen. Call me Electric." I suddenly realized I was yelling above the din of the loops. The Phreak kept putting on more and more. The loops themselves made clicks and static, but the people on them made it even worse. They couldn't hear us and they couldn't hear the people on the other loops, so they loudly chatted away.

Every time Ivanhoe or I heard the Phreak beep on or off, we screamed at him to stop adding loops, but he pretended not to notice, and continued at a rate of six or so a minute.

Finally I couldn't take the noise. I yelled a loop number to Ivanhoe, and we ducked out.

"Hello?" asked a quiet, low voice.

"Hi," I panted. "Thank God we're out of that mess."

"Yeah. He'll probably have it up for a few days before they figure it out," Ivanhoe said.

"He's crazy," I said.

"Yeah, but he knows a lot. He still has a long way to go, though. He has to learn to be careful."

"I know." I tried to act experienced. "Boxing a conference from his home is incredibly stupid."

"Have you heard him on Autovon, though? He's a riot, but I'd never do what he does!"

"What does he do?" I asked.

"He'll have to show you," Ivanhoe said.

Click! "Emergency break from G.I. Joe. Will you accept?" asked the operator.

"No," we said in unison. I smiled, imagining the shocked operator. She probably thought his mother was dying.

"No?" she asked uncertainly.

"NO!" we yelled, and laughed as she clicked off again.

"Well," Ivanhoe said, "that must be Phreak. He probably wants me to call him. I'll tell him to start another conference."

"Okay," I said. I hung up the phone and walked into the kitchen. I set my notebook and pencil on the kitchen desk and took a cold apple from the refrigerator. The phone rang as I crunched the first bite.

"Hello?"

"Hi. Anyone you want to add?" asked the Phreak.

"Sure. Add Trader Vic."

"Okay," he said. I heard a beep, silence, the people talking.

"Quiet down, everyone!" Ivanhoe said. "The Phreak is going to show off, but what he's going to do is pretty dangerous."

Beep-beep! Beep-beep! The Phreak had brought Trader Vic on.

"Hey dudes, what's going on?" he asked.

"Shh!" we said.

"You can't hang up on them once they're on a conference," said Ivanhoe. "If someone suspects what we're doing, we'll have to hang up the whole conference."

The Phreak beeped off. He was back in a minute, talking officiously.

"Yes, I have a Flash Override call for location four-zero-two-niner," he said calmly.

"Flash Override? Who is this, suh?" asked a deep Southern accent.

"This is General Watt." The Phreak had to make the guy believe he was a Joint Chief of Staff.

A nasal tenor came on the line, heralded by an amazing overture of clicks, beeps, and tones.

"General, for whom are you placing this call?"

"For Ronald Reagan," said the Phreak. I felt like I had been stabbed. What an idiot! But I couldn't hang up, because the operator would hear the beeps. I listened instead.

"Ronald Reagan?" asked the voice disbelievingly. "Sir, what is the code on this call?"

"I'm at the White House right now," said the Phreak coolly. I knew he was stalling for time as he flipped through stolen Autovon manuals. "Sergeant, I have the code right here. I'm at location C-one-four-six-two-D, placing a Flash Override for Timberwolf to location four-zero-two-niner. The operation code is zero-five-zero-niner."

"That is correct," the operator said, and I could have hugged the Phreak.

"Please hold, sir, and I'll put your call through."

Beep! Beep!...ker-chunk.

"Andrews Air Force Base," said a woman. "General Hodge is out right now. Should I sound his beeper?"

Silence. What now? Two people spoke at once. Trader Vic broke through loudly.

"Yeah, like, this is a conference call, and we just, like, wanted to see how you were doing, you know?"

"Excuse me?" asked the startled woman.

"I'm sorry," I interrupted quietly. The time had come to try and salvage this thing. "I'm the White House internal operator, and we seem to have given the wrong location identifier. Thank you very much."

The General's secretary clicked off and our nasal operator clicked on. "What seems to be the problem, General?" he asked.

"I'm sorry," Ivanhoe said. "The President decided not to make the call after all. Thank you, though."

"Yes sir, thank you," the operator said, and clicked off. We held our breaths until we heard the final beep-beep.

"Vic, you idiot!" I cried.

"What?" he asked. "I thought it was pretty funny!"

"Funny, my foot," Ivanhoe said angrily. "That was a stupid thing to say. And Steve, why didn't you answer?"

"My mom called me and I had to go take out the trash," said the Phreak.

"Phreak, you're crazy," I said.

"I know," he said in his deepest Boston accent. "But you all love it."

A week later, the Software Pirate called me and said the Phreak had been caught. I called Ivanhoe, who told me that Steve was visited that morning by three FBI and two Bell Security agents. Ten other people were also caught. The FBI woke all the boys up at 6 AM so they wouldn't have a chance to warn friends.

As soon as school was over, the Phreak called Ivanhoe and told him all this. He waited an hour until it was 4:00 in Utah, and called the Software Pirate, who called me.

The news spread among phreaks and pirates so that anyone involved knew about it by dinnertime on the East Coast.

Late that night, the White Knight set up what we thought was the last conference. Ivanhoe, David, Demon Diode, and the Cracker all expected they would be caught.

We called the Cracker and asked him to talk.

"Why not?" he said dryly. "I'm just sitting here waiting for the FBI. I have nothing better to do."

They got him the next morning.

(The names and locations used in this story have all been changed, so don't even bother.)



MCI ACCESS NUMBERS

(Courtesy of Plovernet—5169352481)


AARON, OHIO	(216)	253-1430
ATLANTA, GA.	(404)	523-0003
AUSTIN, TEXAS	(512)	473-2716
BALTIMORE, MD.	(301)	321-8933
BOSTON, MASS.	(617)	482-2888
CHICAGO, ILL.	(312)	321-6581
CINCINNATI, OHIO	(513)	241-1216
CLEVELAND, OHIO	(216)	621-2371
COLUMBUS, OHIO	(614)	224-0970
DALLAS, TEXAS	(214)	742-6888
DAYTON, OHIO	(513)	228-0241
DENVER, COLORADO	(303)	837-8638
DETROIT, MICH.	(313)	962-6906
FT. LAUDERDALE, FL.	(305)	462-1818
FT. WORTH, TEXAS	(817)	338-9004
HOUSTON, TEXAS	(713)	224-6098
INDIANAPOLIS, INDIANA	(317)	632-8739
KANSAS CITY, MO.	(816)	836-1810
LOS ANGELES, CALIF.	(213)	488-1871
LUBBOCK, TEXAS	(806)	744-8879
MIDLAND/ODESS, TEXAS	(915)	561-5130
MILWAUKEE, WISCONSIN	(414)	933-7351
MINNEAPOLIS, MINN.	(612)	341-2835
NEWARK, NJ.	(201)	645-9040
NEW ORLEANS, LA.	(504)	566-8970
NEW YORK, NY.	(212)	397-1020
OKLAHOMA CITY, OK. (#1)	(405)	525-8963
OMAHA, NEBRASKA	(402)	422-0306
PHILADELPHIA, PA.	(215)	561-3199
PHOENIX, AZ.	(602)	249-0716
PITTSBURGH, PA.	(412)	261-4905
ST. LOUIS, MO.	(314)	342-0280
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS	(512)	226-8505
SAN DIEGO, CALIF.	(714)	560-1465
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIF.	(415)	495-2500
SOUTH BEND, IND.	(219)	232-8036
STAMFORD, CT.	(203)	348-0929
TOLEDO, OHIO	(419)	243-2048
TUCSON, ARIZONA	(602)	622-0212
TULSA, OKLAHOMA	(918)	583-9082
WASHINGTON, D.C.	(202)	872-1847

Following are MCI Mail local access phone numbers:

Atlanta, GA.....	(404)	577-7363
Baltimore, MD.....	(301)	583-6850
Boston, MA.....	(617)	262-6468
Buffalo, NY.....	(716)	847-6050
Chicago, IL.....	(312)	856-9000
Cincinnati, OH.....	(513)	651-1204
Cleveland, OH.....	(216)	771-7177
Columbus, OH.....	(614)	221-3451
Dallas, TX.....	(214)	754-0461
Denver, CO.....	(303)	831-8139
Detroit, MI.....	(313)	962-5980
Ft. Worth, TX.....	(817)	338-4159
Hartford, CT.....	(203)	728-1909
Houston, TX.....	(713)	850-1005
Indianapolis, IN....	(317)	634-2208
Kansas City, MO....	(816)	474-3169
Long Island (Garden City Area), NY.		(516) 596-0404
Los Angeles, CA....	(213)	620-1449
Memphis, TN.....	(901)	523-9314
Milwaukee, WI.....	(414)	347-1769
Minneapolis, MN....	(612)	893-9462
Newark, NJ.....	(201)	623-0295
New York City, NY..	(212)	245-0355
Oakland, CA.....	(415)	540-1114
Philadelphia, Pa....	(215)	636-9060
Phoenix, AZ.....	(602)	266-1148
Pittsburgh, PA.....	(412)	261-9918
Rochester, NY.....	(716)	955-9850
Sacramento, CA.....	(916)	442-6986
San Diego, CA.....	(619)	268-1708
San Francisco, CA..	(415)	543-1560
San Jose, CA.....	(408)	995-6711
Santa Ana, CA.....	(714)	550-7128
Stamford, CT.....	(203)	325-8133
St. Louis, MO.....	(314)	991-1881
Washington, DC.....	(703)	525-6500

- National Toll-Free Access Number
 -----(800) 323-0905-----
 (800) 323-7751






Dial the One-Plus way. Saving money can be fun.

Every employee of the Telephone Company carries an identification card. We suggest that you refuse access to your premises to anyone who represents himself as from the telephone company, but who cannot so identify himself.

•You'll get faster service on your long distance calls by dialing the complete number, including "1" + Area Code whenever and wherever possible.



IF YOUR NUMBER HAS BEEN CHANGED



... Advise friends of the change—they'll be able to call you more easily.

•Keep a smile in your voice.

•Be quick to answer your telephone calls. Be slow to hang up when making a call. Give the other fellow at least one minute to answer.



• For better service—speak directly into the telephone.





Keep a pad and pencil by the phone. It'll come in handy.

•Wait for dial tone.

✓
WHENEVER POSSIBLE
remain on the
line after you've
placed a call

Talk is cheap. . .When you call on Saturday.



please dial carefully

Please be careful not to confuse the letter "I" with the numeral "one," or the letter "O" with the numeral "zero" when dialing.

